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THE FEE AWARDS ACT OF 1976:
EXAMINING THE FOUNDATION FOR
LEGISLATIVE REFORM OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES SHIFTING
RANDALL R. RADER*

INTRODUCTION

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981,
1982, 1983, 1985 and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or
in any civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United
States of America, to enforce, or charging a violation of, a provision
of the United States Internal Revenue Code, or title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than1 the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee
as part of the costs.
Since first established by the Supreme Court in 1796,2 the
basic rule for the compensation of counsel within the American
judicial system has been that each litigant pay his own attorney.
In the absence of a statutory rule to the contrary, courts do not
involve themselves in private economic transactions between
litigants and their chosen legal representatives. Regarding the
power of judicial officers to require a losing party to pay the attorney's fees of a successful litigant, the Supreme Court has
forthrightly pronounced that attorney's fees "are not ordinarily
recoverable in the absence of a statute or enforceable contract
'3
providing therefor."
In 1967, Chief Justice Earl Warren articulated some reasons
why American courts opted not to apply the English rule authorizing courts to set compensation for attorneys: "[S] ince litigation is at best uncertain, one should not be penalized for merely
defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and . . . the poor might be
unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their
rights if the penalty for losing included the fees of their opponent's counsel."'4 The American rule also has the virtue of ensuring that an attorney only serves one master, thus avoiding
* J.D., with honors, George Washington University; General Counsel,
Constitution Subcommittee, United States Senate.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
2. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 Dall. 306 (1796).
3. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717

(1967) (attorney's fees are not recoverable under the Lanham Act).
4. Id. at 718.
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potential conflicts which might arise if an attorney's compensation were determined by a source other than his client.
American courts have fashioned two common law exceptions to the traditional rule that each party pay his own attorney. The first exception to the American rule arises when a
party, at his own expense, creates a fund or achieves a substantial benefit in which others share. This exception, known as the
common-fund doctrine, does not shift the cost of attorneys to
5
the losing party, but rather to those who benefit from the suit.
As stated by the Supreme Court in 1980, "[t]he common-fund
doctrine ... is entirely consistent with the American rule
against taxing the losing party with the victor's attorney's fees
...each class member [has an] equitable obligation to share
'6
the expenses of litigation."
The second exception to the American rule is that "a federal
court may award counsel fees to a successful party when his opponent has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons. '7 In cases involving bad faith, the rationale
for assessing fees against the unsuccessful litigant is punitive.
In "narrowly defined circumstances," an attorney, as well as a
party, who abuses judicial processes can be charged with the
fees of his opponent's attorney.8
Prior to 1975, federal courts had begun to forge a third exception to the American rule. On the theory that the courts
should provide some incentive and reward for attorneys who enforce certain important rights, some lower federal courts had
created a "private attorney general" rationale for shifting attorney's fees. 9 In the case of Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 10 the Supreme Court ruled that federal courts,
in the absence of express statutory authorization, lack power to
5. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (absence of statu-

tory authorization did not preclude fee award to minority shareholders entitled to relief for misrepresentation in corporate merger); Trustees v.
Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881) (bondholders in successful action against
bond security fund trustees for waste and mismanagement were entitled to
counsel fees).
6. Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 481-82 (1980) (class action by
bondholders).
7. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973).
8. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765 (1980) (award of
fees for abuse of discovery held not authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1927, but
within Court's inherent powers).
9. For an extensive listing of lower federal court cases which employed

the private-attorney-general approach, see Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 270 n. 46 (1974).
10. 421 U.S. 240 (1974) (plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent the issuance of construction permits for the trans-Alaska oil pipeline).
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create such an exception." The primary reason given by the
Court for rejecting the private attorney general exception to the
American rule was that "it would be difficult, indeed, for the
courts, without legislative guidance, to consider some statutes
important and others unimportant and to allow attorneys' fees
only in connection with the former."' 12 Applying these principles, the Court held that fees could not be awarded simply on
the basis of the public interest nature of litigation.
Alyeska also clarified the basic rule that Congress is free to
create exceptions to the American rule by enacting statutes specifically authorizing the award of attorney's fees to a prevailing
party. In response to the Alyeska case, Congress has repeatedly
enacted such statutory exceptions. With such enactments, Congress has stated its intent to rely upon "private attorneys general," in lieu of administrative programs and sanctions, to
13
judicially enforce many of its policies.
As these federal fee shifting statutes have multiplied to well
over 100,14 the number of fee awards and the complexity of litigation to determine the amount of such awards has increased
almost exponentially.' 5 For instance, during one month of 1980,
the United States Supreme Court rendered six major attorney's
fees rulings, nine rulings for that entire year.' 6 In the same
11. [Cjongressional utilization of the private attorney concept can in
no sense be construed as a grant of authority to the Judiciary to jettison
the traditional rule against non-statutory allowances to the prevailing
party and to award attorneys' fees whenever the court deems the public
policy furthered by a particular statute important enough to warrant
the award.
Id. at 263.
12. Id. at 263-64.
13. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1976) (reports
accompanying the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (1976)).
14. See E. LARSON, FEDERAL COURT AWARDS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES, App.
C. (1981); Rose, Reform of Civil Rights Fee Award PracticesNeeded, Legal
Times, Feb. 13, 1984, at 13. (Mr. Rose speaks of "approximately 129" fee
shifting statutes.)
15. Larson, Attorney's Fees Under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976, 1981 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 309.
16. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1980) (award of fees for defense of complaint against state corrections officers held improper under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988); Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980) (award of fees under Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act against state not barred by eleventh
amendment); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (award of fees to persons
unlawfully deprived of welfare benefits upheld under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
1988); Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980) (award of fees within
Court's inherent power); New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54
(1980) (federal district court's award of fees for successful prosecution of
discrimination claim held proper under 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-5(k)); Supreme
Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980) (award of fees
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to enforce prohibition against attorney advertising);
Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754 (1980) (plaintiff who did not prevail on
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year, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued over 50 reported
decisions on attorney's fees. 17 Many of these awards are not inconsequential. In one case, the Center for Law in the Public Interest was awarded $2,204,534.99.18
A further indication that
litigation over attorney's fees has snowballed is that the West
Publishing Company's case annotations accompanying 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988, the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976,19
20
now occupy over 179 pages of fine print.
Ironically, the statutory exception is threatening to engulf
the entire American rule on award of attorney's fees. Already
these exceptions have called into question one of the primary
policy underpinnings for the rule. In Fleischmann v. Maier
Brewing Co.,2 1 the Supreme Court provided an important explanation for the American rule by determining that "the time, expense, and difficulties of proof inherent in litigating the question
of what constitutes reasonable attorney's fees would pose substantial burdens for judicial administration. '22 The time, expense, and difficulties of proof in attorney's fees litigation
engendered by the multiplication of private attorney general
statutes already impose substantial burdens on judicial administration. In this regard, Justice Brennan recently wrote that attorney's fees litigation all too often "serves no productive
purpose, vindicates no one's civil rights, and exacerbates the
myriad problems of crowded appellate dockets. '23 In a similar
tone, the entire Court in 1983 commented that "a request for attorneys' fees should not result in a second major litigation." 24 In
that same 1983 case, Justice Brennan wrote a colorful concurmerits not entitled to fees under Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act);

Bloomer v. Liberty Mutual, 445 U.S. 74 (1980) (stevedore-employer not required under Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers Compensation Act to
share longshoremen's legal costs against shipowner);

Boeing v. Van

Gemert, 444 U.S. 472 (1980) (award of fees to attorneys representing class of
all holders of defendant company's convertible debentures approved under
common-fund theory).
17. See E. LARSON, supra note 14, App. D.
18. Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. Supp. 403 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (attorneys successfully challenged freeway project to ensure compliance with affirmative action and environmental regulations).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
20. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West 1981) at 155-305 and (West Supp. 1983) at 1348. The Foreword of a new three-volume treatise on attorney's fees litigation aptly characterizes this alarming growth. "[This] new field of law...
has grown so fast and become so complex that it has baffled the efforts of
couts and lawyers to comprehend and apply it." Cutler, Forward to M.
DERFNER & A. WOLF, COURT AWARDED ArrORNEY FEES (1983).
21. 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
22. Id. at 718.
23. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1950 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
24. Id. at 1941.
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rence capturing the Court's frustration. Justice Brennan determined "[u]ltimately [the fee shifting statute's] straightforward
command is replaced by a vast body of artificial, judge-made
doctrine, with its own arcane procedures, which, like Frankenstein's monster, meanders its well-intentioned way through the
legal landscape leaving waste and confusion (not to mention cir'25
cuit splits) in its wake.
Although Congress has not consciously determined to repeal the American rule, its enactment of myriad fee shifting
statutes has seriously eroded the foundations of that 197-yearold policy. E. Richard Larson, author of a major treatise on
court-awarded attorney's fees, shares this assessment:
The bread-and-butter character of fee awards, not surprisingly, has
spawned an extraordinary amount of fee litigation in recent years.
... The explosion of fee litigation has occurred primarily because
the "American rule"-under which parties are required to bear
their26own fees-has now become the exception rather than the
rule.
Congress has yet to review comprehensively the impact of
its piecemeal enactments on the overall policy of the American
rule. The time is ripe for that comprehensive consideration. By
focusing on 42 U.S.C. § 1988, this article intends to examine current anomalies in federal fee shifting policy with an eye to legislative corrections which might reinforce the basic policies of the
American rule while also supplying adequate incentives to obtain competent counsel for meritorious claims.
CIviL RIGrrs

ATrORNEY'S FEES AWARD ACT OF

1976

The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988,
best presents the plethora of issues created by current congressional fee shifting policies. Section 1988 was enacted in direct
response to the Alyeska case. The Senate report provided:
This amendment . . . gives the Federal courts the discretion to
award attorney's fees to prevailing parties in suits brought to enforce the civil rights acts which Congress has passed since 1866.
The purpose of this amendment is to remedy anomalous gaps in
our civil rights laws created by the [Alyeska case] .,27
The House of Representatives noted "[t]he application of these
standards will insure that reasonable fees are awarded to attract
competent counsel in cases involving civil and constitutional
'28
rights, while avoiding windfalls to attorneys.
25. Id. at 1951.
26. Larson, supra note 15, at 309.
27. S. REP., No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 1, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908.

28. H.R. REP., supra note 13, at 9.
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The proponents of the Fees Act, as well as most of its opponents, generally agreed on the Act's objective, namely that the
"civil rights laws depend heavily upon private enforcement, and
fee awards have proved an essential remedy if private citizens
are to have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate ... important
congressional policies. ' 29 The real question was how to achieve
that objective. Because the terms of the Act are few, the operative language consists of only 24 words, the legislative history
has been critical to discerning the means Congress chose to
reach its purpose. Selected excerpts from that history have
been cited to support three different concepts of how Congress
intended to ensure that civil rights laws are not left without a
means of judicial enforcement.
One viewpoint, with little support in report language or floor
speeches, posits that the Act was "not simply to enable civil
rights plaintiffs to obtain attorneys, but also to equalize the resources of the parties in these cases by providing the civil rights
lawyers with the same economic incentives. . . available to defendant's counsel. '30 This position draws support from a few
statements made during the debate about potentially disparate
resources of civil rights plaintiffs and governmental defendants. 31 The House report, however, places those comments in
their proper context. When discussing the bill's dual standard
with respect to prevailing defendants and prevailing plaintiffs,
the House report notes that "applying the same standard of recovery to such prevailing defendants would further widen the
gap between citizens and government officials and would exacerbate the inequality of litigating strength. '3 2 Congress did take
into account the potential disparities between the litigating resources of civil rights plaintiffs and governmental defendants,
but it did not attempt to equalize the compensation of plaintiff's
and defendant's lawyers. If Congress' objective had been to
equalize the resources of the parties, it would not have put the
plaintiff at risk of receiving no attorney's fee compensation if he
failed to prevail, nor would it have left the award of or amount of
the fee to the discretion of the judge. 33 If Congress had wanted
to ensure that in all cases civil rights attorneys received the
same compensation as defendant attorneys, Congress would
29. S. REP., supra note 27, at 2.
30. Counsel Fees in Public Interest Litigation,Ass'N

OF THE

BAR

OF THE

Crry OF N.Y. REP. 8 (1984).
31. 122 CONG. REC. S.17051

(daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976) (statement of Senator Tunney); H.R. REP., supra note 13, at 7.
32. See supra note 31.
33. 122 CONG. REC. S.17052 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976) (statement of Sena-

tor Kennedy).
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have had to compensate them for the effort expended in bringing losing, as well as winning, lawsuits.
Congress was simply not interested in equal attorney remuneration when it enacted section 1988. The bulk of the legislative history focuses not on attorneys and their economic
incentives, but on redressing civil rights violations and helping
citizens who may lack the resources to pursue a meritorious
case. Congress focused on needy plaintiffs with meritorious
suits, not lawyer remuneration. In the words of Senator Kennedy, "this bill is not for the purpose of aiding lawyers. '34 Congress considered the disparate resources of potential litigants
only to the degree that it provided a different standard of fee
recovery for prevailing defendants and plaintiffs.
The second position on the question of Congress' means for
giving civil rights plaintiffs access to the courts is that the Act is
designed to encourage litigation.35 At times, language in the reports and debates leave this impression. For example, the Senate report explains that "Congress has commonly authorized
attorney's fees in laws under which private attorneys general
play a significant role in enforcing our policies .... In the civil
rights area, Congress has instructed the courts to use the
broadest and most effective remedies available to achieve the
goals of our civil rights laws. '36 The Senate report referred to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act as an example of how Congress
had carried out those policies in the past by encouraging judicial
enforcement of individual rights.37 Once again, however, Congress did not provide fee awards for all civil rights plaintiffs, but
only for prevailing civil rights plaintiffs. Congress repeatedly
38
expressed concern that the Act could spawn more litigation.
Instead of encouraging litigation for litigation's sake, the Act
concentrated on removing financial barriers to meritorious
lawsuits.
Thus, the most documented position concerning Congress'
intent is best explained by the Senate report:
In many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen who
must sue to enforce the law has little or no money with which to
34. Id
35. 122 CONG. REC. S.16251 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976) (statement of Senator Hugh Scott) ("Congress should encourage citizens to go to court.
.

36. S.REP., supra note 27, at 3.
37. Id.
38. 122 CONG. REC. S.16880 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1976) (statement Senator
William Scott) (". . . this will encourage further litigation ...we already
have a backlog of cases. . . ."); 122 CONG. REC. S.16254 (daily ed. Sept. 21,
1976) (statement of Senator Allen) ("This bill would stir up litigation."); 122
CONG. REc. S.16270 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976) (statement of Senator Long)
("For the Government to be paying the lawyers to sue people... can be a
never-ending thing..
").
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hire a lawyer. If private citizens are to be able to assert their civil
rights and if those who violate the Nation's fundamental laws are
not to proceed with impunity, then citizens must have the opportunity to
recover what it costs them to vindicate these rights in
39
court.

The key word here is "opportunity." This point of view posits
that the Act was intended to remove financial barriers to meritorious adjudications, rather than to encourage suits for their own
sake. Senator Nathias, a strong proponent of the Act, expressed
this principle by claiming that the goal, to provide access to the
courts for those seeking to enforce their civil rights laws, is clear
and compelling. 4° Senator Tunney, the Act's Senate sponsor,
echoed that the Act would afford successful plaintiffs "the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate these rights
'4 1
in courts.
In accord with this last and prevalent view, considerable
language in the House and Senate Reports and other statements
during floor consideration in both houses indicated that the Act
was a "narrowly drawn" and a "rather limited and cautious [first
step]" to enforce only "major civil rights laws."'42 Nonetheless, it
has become the most expansive of all fee shifting statutes.
Much of this result can be attributed to the Supreme Court case
of Maine v. Thiboutot43 which made the Act applicable to a wide
range of federal laws beyond the scope of civil rights policies. 44
In Thiboutot, the Court held that section 1983, the Ku Klux Klan
Act of 1871, was not limited to civil rights laws but created a potential tort action for every federal statute. 45 Justice Powell, dissenting, apprehended the significance of this holding for
attorney's fees litigation by claiming that "ingenious pleaders
may find ways to recover attorney's fees in almost any suit
against a state defendant.' 46 He further noted that some section
1983 claims were being pled as an afterthought in order to obtain
fees. 47 Commenting on this warning by Justice Powell, a recent
study by the National Association of Attorneys General noted
39. S. REP., supra note 27, at 2.
40. 122 CONG. REC. 16251 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976) (statement of Senator
Mathias).
41. See supra note 31.
42. 122 CONG. REC. H.35126 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976) (statement of Rep.
Kastenmeier) ("narrowly drawn;" "only a first step and a rather limited and
cautious one"); 122 CON. REC. S.16252 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976) (statement of
Senator Kennedy) ("major civil rights laws").
43. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
44. Id. at 4.
45. Id. (The Ku Klux Klan Act imposes civil liability on any person who,
under color of state law, violates "the Constitution and laws" of the United
States).

46. Id. at 24.
47. Id.
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that unfortunately Justice Powell's prediction had become reality in that fees were being routinely sought in cases having little
or no bearing on civil rights.48 The National Association of Attorneys General study then proceeded to cite examples of litigants "pad[ding] their meritorious state law complaints with
weak or meritless civil rights claims in order to obtain fees
under Section 1988. ' '4
Beyond its applicability to countless federal statutes, another reason for section 1988's preeminence among fee shifting
statutes is the weight given to its permissive legislative history
in construing other statutes. For example, the Supreme Court
relied on the legislative history of section 1988 to award fees to a
50
public interest law firm which had won a Title VII suit.
Because of its preeminence among fee shifting statutes, section 1988, the Fees Act, has also been the focus of criticism from
academicians, the bar, and the bench for its production of a flood
of inconclusive litigation. It was this law to which the Supreme
Court addressed itself when it noted that fees litigation is "one
1
of the least socially productive types of litigation imaginable."'
It was this law that was before the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit when it lamented that "fee proceedings have become the main event rather than the side show" and that "the
[attorney fees] tail is waggling the [civil rights] dog."52 It was
this law to which Justice, then Judge, Sandra Day O'Connor referred when recommending that action should be taken to limit
its use. 53 It was this law that prompted the National Association
of Attorneys General to conclude that legislative reform was urgently needed to curtail the burden and expense of fee awards.
The Association further noted that exorbitant awards were not
the sole problem, in that the costs of opposing unjustified claims
for fees were also becoming troublesome. 54 It was this law
which prompted several witnesses before the Senate Judiciary
48. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, REP. To CONGRESS
OF NAT'L ASS'N OF Arr'y GEN. 12 (Feb. 3, 1984) [hereinafter cited as NAAG
REP.].

49. Id.
50. See, e.g., New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. at 70-71 n. 9
(1980).
51. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1944 (1983).
52. Mills v. Eltra Corp., 663 F.2d 760, 761 (7th Cir. 1981) (attorney sued to
recover fees for services rendered in a stockholder's disclosure suit to set
aside a merger).
53. Justice O'Connor asserted that this "could be accomplished either
directly, or indirectly by limiting or disallowing recovery of attorney fees.
Such a move would be welcomed by state courts, as well as state legislatures and executive officers." O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State Courtsfrom the Perspective of a State Court
Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 801, 810 (1981).
54. NAAG REP., supra note 48.
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Subcommittee on the Constitution to testify in general that "the
manner in which the courts have implemented the Act provides
an incentive for the bringing of frivolous lawsuits. '55 This law
forms the backbone of federal fee shifting policy and serves as
an excellent laboratory for examination of the erosion of the
American rule.
Court Discretion: Special Circumstances
The operative language of the Fees Act states that "the
court in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs. '5 6 The discretionary language of section 1988 was
stressed during the process of its enactment.5 7 The Senate Report, however, suggested that the standard for the discretionary
award of attorney's fees had been well articulated by a 1968 case
dealing with awards under the fee shifting aspects of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. That case ordered that the prevailing party
"should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.158 What the
Senate report failed to take into account is that the fee shifting
provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act were designed to encourage plaintiffs to seek judicial relief,59 while section 1988 was
designed to ensure that the costs of litigation did not prevent the
adjudication of meritorious claims. 60 Thus, the Senate report
endorsed a standard broadly designed to encourage litigation for
a bill with the narrower objective of overcoming economic obstacles to meritorious litigation. 6 1 The discretionary language of
section 1988 was designed to allow courts to ascertain when an
award of fees was necessary to remove obstacles to litigation for
55. S. 585: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on the Constitutionof the Senator Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 101 (1982) (statement of

James B. Brennan) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) (emphasis added).
57. For example, the House report states:
The second key feature of the bill is its mandate that fees are only to be
allowed in the discretion of the court. Congress has passed many statutes requiring that fees be awarded to a prevailing party. Again the
Committee adopted a more moderate approach here by leaving the
matter to the discretion of the judge.
H.R. REP., supra note 13, at 8.
58. S. REP., supra note 27, at 3 (quoting from Newman v. Piggie Park
Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)).
59. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
60. See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text; Hensley v. Eckerhart,
103 S. Ct. 1933, 1937. ("The purpose of section 1988 is to ensure 'effective
access to the judicial process' for persons with civil rights grievances."); see
also S. REP., supra note 27, at 2, 3, 6; H.R. REP., supra note 13, at 1-3, 6.
61. M. DERFNER & A. WoLF, supra note 20, at § 10.01; NAAG REP., supra
note 48, at 22-23.
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similarly situated plaintiffs. 62 The Supreme Court has not directly considered the questions raised by the nature of the judicial discretion conferred by the statute, but a recent ruling
repeated the Senate Report language and tends to cement in
63
place the special circumstances limitation.
The practical effect of the special circumstances limitation
on the judges' discretion is that rarely have fees been denied as
unjust. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Riddle v.
Democratic National Committee,6 4 explained that special circumstances should be found only in unusual cases. The opinion
offered two examples of such cases. 65 The first type of case identified by the court as unworthy of fees arises when a litigant attempts to falsely gain the benefits of section 1988 by cloaking a
private state law tort claim in language asserting a violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983. The second type of case arises when the plaintiff
achieves the result sought by the lawsuit, but his adjudication
did not contribute to that result. 66 Clearly the discretion to deny
claims for fees under these few special circumstances is narrow.
The Ninth Circuit, however, has upheld denials of fees when
the plaintiffs' suit wins monetary damages sufficient to cover the
costs of litigation. In Buxton v. Patel,67 the claimants won damages in excess of their attorney's fees which were discretionarily
denied by the district court. The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court because the litigants were "adequately compensated"
and because their "chance of success was sufficiently high to enable them to attract competent counsel who were undeterred by
the prospect of having to look to the appellants for payment of
their fees." 68 This ruling is consonant with the avowed purpose
of section 1988, namely, removing economic barriers to meritorious litigation. The reasoning of the Ninth Circuit reinvigorates
the judicial discretion necessary to carry out that intent and preclude abuse of fee shifting policies.
In the bulk of all litigation over the special circumstances
test, courts have concluded that the test should not apply. It is
not a special circumstance when: the plaintiff had access to or
employed the services of a public-funded legal aid bureau or the
62. See supra note 61.
63. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1937 (1983).

64. 624 F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 1980).
65. Id. at 544. See also Judicial Discretion and the 1976 Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act: What Special Circumstances Render an Award
Unjust, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 320 (1982).
66. Knights of KKK v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 643 F.2d
1034, vacated and remanded, 454 U.S. 1075, on remand 679 F.2d 64 (5th Cir.

1981).
67. 595 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1979).

68. Id. at 1185.
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plaintiff is a public-funded agency;69 the plaintiff had the capacity to pay for an attorney without resort to the Fees Act;70 the
plaintiff's case benefited only himself as opposed to benefiting
the public more generally; 71 the plaintiff will not be personally
benefitted by the award of fees; 72 the plaintiff only won nominal
damages or damages far exceeded by the amount of the fee
74
award request;73 the plaintiff refused a favorable settlement;
the plaintiff's request would have to be satisfied out of tax revenues and could cause financial difficulty for or a reduction in
75
services provided by the governmental entity to be held liable;
the plaintiff's case was very simple, requiring little attorney
time; 76 the plaintiff's fee request is substantially comprised of
time spent by attorneys in pursuit of the fee itself;77 the plaintiff
only achieved partial success; 78 the plaintiff committed perjury
during trial; 79 or finally when, the plaintiff's suit was based on
actions undertaken by the defendant in good faith or in reliance
on previous court orders. 80
Under the special circumstances limitation, the discretion of
the federal judiciary to determine when fees are warranted to
surmount financial hurdles to meritorious claims is,

in

most

69. Blum v. Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984) (plaintiff represented by attorneys from Legal Aid Society of New York); Seattle School Dist. v. Washington, 633 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir.), afd, 458 U.S. 457 (1980) (plaintiffs were
three school districts); Bills v. Hodges, 628 F.2d 844 (4th Cir. 1980) (plaintiffs
were tenants who had sufficient funds to pay fees).
70. Entertainment Concepts v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1980) (defendant municipal officials held liable for attorney's fees in their official capacities); cf. International Oceanic Enters. v.
Menton, 614 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1980) (wealthy corporation was not entitled to
fees for successful challenge of zoning ordinance).
71. Perez v. University of Puerto Rico, 600 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979) (students brought suit against university for impaired due process rights in
summary suspensions).
72. Herrara v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1981) (original plaintiff
replaced by administrator of her estate).
73. Milwe v. Cavuoto, 653 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1981) (plaintiff awarded judgment of one dollar); Skoda v. Fontani, 646 F.2d 1193 (3d Cir. 1981) (one dollar awarded to plaintiff).
74. Coop v. South Bend, 635 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1980) (unless party unduly prolongs litigation with no hope of a greater recovery).
75. Entertainment Concepts v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1980); Johnson v. Mississippi, 606 F.2d 635 (5th Cir.
1979); Sharrock v. Harris, 489 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
76. Staten v. Housing Auth. of Pittsburgh, 638 F.2d 599 (3d Cir. 1980).
77. Criterion Club of Albany v. Board of Comm'rs, 594 F.2d 118 (5th Cir.
1979).
78. Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 602 F.2d 894 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1046 (1979).
79. Price v. Pelka, 690 F.2d 98 (6th Cir. 1982).
80. Ramos v. Koebig, 638 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1981); Entertainment Concepts v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1980);
Johnson v. Mississippi, 606 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1979).
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cases, a nullity. A recently enacted fee shifting statute applicable only to suits against the federal government has restored
such discretion by specifying that judges may not award fees
when the government's case is substantially justified.8 1 This
particular statute, the Equal Access to Justice Act, like section
1988, is intended to remove obstacles to litigation rather than to
encourage lawsuits. This suggests that Congress is becoming
more sensitive to the need for reasonable standards to govern
judicial discretion to deny fees.
Awards Against State and Local Officers
Several of the categories denied special circumstances consideration deserve additional commentary due to their significance in continuing litigation. For example, lawsuits assessing
fee awards against state and local officials in their official capacities have presented many recurring issues. Until a recent pronouncement by the Supreme Court, a frequent issue was
whether awarding attorney's fees against a state violates the
eleventh amendment's proscription against federal court assessment of damages against states. 8 2 In Hutto v. Finney,83 several
inmates in an Arkansas state prison sued prison officials under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the conditions of their confinement
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. On the basis of orders to halt the use of isolation cells, the plaintiffs prevailed.
When the lower court also granted $20,000 in attorney's fees to
be paid out of state funds, the state attorney general asserted
the eleventh amendment as a bar. The Court upheld the fee and
determined that "a financial penalty may be the most effective
means of insuring compliance with a court order. '8 4 The court
also noted that "the principles of federalism that inform the
Eleventh Amendment doctrine surely do not require federal
courts to enforce their decrees only by sending high state officials to jail."'85 Hutto establishes that attorney's fees may be assessed against a state regardless of the eleventh amendment.
The Supreme Court reasoned that the eleventh amendment is
no bar because attorney's fees are part of the cost of litigation.
81. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982). Congress created this provision to preclude awards against the government in
instances of "good faith ...interpretations of law that often underlie vigorous enforcement efforts." S. REP. No. 253, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1980).
82. U.S. CONST. amend. XI: "The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or

by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
83. 437 U.S. 678, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1978).
84. Id. at 691.

85. Id.
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In the words of the Court, "costs have traditionally been
awarded without regard for the States' Eleventh Amendment
immunity" against federal suits creating state liabilities. 86
The Fifth Circuit case of Universal Amusement Co. v.

Hofheinz87 concisely summarizes the conclusions of earlier
Supreme Court pronouncements regarding a state or local official's defense of good faith. In Universal the court determined
that "the good faith of an official is irrelevant to an award of attorney's fees against him in his official capacity, but bad faith
must be shown in order to hold an official personally liable for
attorney's fees."8 8 The basic rule relies on language in the congressional reports specifically authorizing fees to the prevailing
party regardless of the good faith of the defendant. 89 Thus, fees
have been assessed against a city even when its public officials
acted in full reliance on existing state and federal case law. 90
Fees for Public-FundedEntities

Another issue litigated extensively is the appropriateness of
granting attorney's fees out of public coffers to entities that are
already publicly financed. The basis of this argument is that, by
funding a legal services organization, Congress has already removed any obstacle to litigation faced by the needy plaintiff and
has thus satisfied the purpose of the Fees Act. This contention
was stated most graphically during Senate Judiciary Committee
hearings by Leroy S. Zimmerman, Attorney General for the
State of Pennsylvania:
The Pennsylvania Legislature, as well as other States lawmaking
bodies, cannot anticipate such [high fee] awards and funds for
their payment must be diverted for necessary governmental functions. The inability to anticipate for budgetary purposes always is
onerous to State legislatures but is manifestly unfair when the
awards are made to legal services organizations already funded by
public moneys.
This double-dipping must be stopped by the
91
Congress.
In one case, the Fifth Circuit did uphold a denial of fees to a
publicly-funded legal services organization, but not on the basis
of a "double dipping" argument or on the intent of the Fees
Act. 92 The Fifth Circuit noted that the legal services attorney's

work was duplicative and unnecessary to the resolution of the
86. Id. at 695.
87. 616 F.2d 202 (5th Cir.), modified, 646 F.2d 996 (1980).

88. Id. at 204 n. 1.
89. S. REP. supra note 27, at 5.
90. Johnson v. Mississippi, 606 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1979) (defendants relied on earlier case upholding constitutionality of a similar statute).
91. Hearings,supra note 55, at 86.

92. Taylor v. Sterrett, 640 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1981).
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case. 93 The Supreme Court has been urged to rule that representation by a publicly-funded lawyer constitutes a special circumstance warranting denial of fees. Relying on the House
report's assertion that "a prevailing party is entitled to counsel
fees even if represented by an organization" 94 and two court of
appeals decisions, 95 the Court in dicta rejected that argument. 96
Although financial obstacles to any case brought by such attorneys have already been removed, this language from the Court
has apparently allowed attorney fee awards to publicly-funded
lawyers.
PrevailingParties
Section 1988 authorizes the award of a reasonable attorney's
fee only to the prevailing party. Determining who is a prevailing
party for fee awards is one of the most frequently litigated issues in the entire body of attorney's fees law. As the words
"prevailing party" suggest, a litigant must both show that he is
the proper party and that he has prevailed in order to establish a
claim for counsel fees.
Proper Party Status
In a complex lawsuit with many different parties, each may
have a different relationship to the litigant who initiated the suit
to vindicate his own rights. A party who intervenes at the appeal stage, for instance, will not make nearly the same contribution to the case in terms of time or substance as is made by the
initial parties. A footnote in the Senate Report acknowledges
that Congress intended intervenors to enjoy some eligibility for
fee awards. 97 A 1982 opinion of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia considered this footnote and nonetheless drew
a sharp distinction between intervenors and parties who prevailed on their own. In the Voting Rights Act case of Donnell v.
United States,98 the defendant was the federal government,
which hardly needed the assistance of an intervenor. Rather
than automatically approving fees for the defendant-intervenor,
the District of Columbia Circuit established a new three-part
test governing an intervenor's eligibility to recover attorney's
fees. The court determined that a district court must first ascertain whether the original party adequately represented the in93. Id at 670.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

H.R. REP., supra note 13, at 8.
Blum v. Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984).
Id. at 1547.
S. REP., supra note 27, at 4 n. 4.
682 F.2d 240 (D.C.Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1204 (1983).
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tervenor's position. 99 Second, the court must determine
whether the intervenor's participation introduced any different
theories than were presented by the original party and third,
whether the intervenor's contribution was of importance to the
court. 100 In essence, this test is likely to bar an intervenor from
recovering attorney's fees unless his contribution to the success
of the litigation was substantial and not merely duplicative.
Another proper party question involves defendants. If a defendant prevails, the plain meaning of section 1988 would suggest that he is eligible on the same basis as other litigants to
claim counsel fees. This issue came before the Supreme Court
when the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission sued a
company on a Title VII charge that had ripened for adjudication
two years before the Commission was granted authority to sue
in its own name.10 1 Since the charge was not properly pending
before the Commission when it obtained the authority to sue,
the case was dismissed. The defendant company had prevailed.
When the Supreme Court considered the defendant's claim for
attorney's fees, however, it noted two strong reasons for treating
a prevailing defendant differently than a prevailing plaintiff.
The Court determined first that "the plaintiff is the chosen instrument of Congress to vindicate a 'policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.' "102 Second, when a district
court awards counsel fees to a prevailing plaintiff, it is awarding
them against a violator of federal law. 10 3 The plaintiff, not the
defendant, is the private attorney general delegated by Congress to enforce civil rights. Accordingly, prevailing plaintiffs
and prevailing defendants are governed by a dual standard.
Although a prevailing defendant must abide by a different
standard to recover attorney's fees, the statute by its terms authorizes a recovery for any prevailing party. In a Title VII case,
the Supreme Court concluded that "a district court may in its
discretion award attorneys' fees to a prevailing defendant ...
upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith."' 1 4
A few years later, the Supreme Court considered the prevailing defendant problem in the context of section 1988. In
99. Id at 247-48.
100. Id.

101.
102.
(1968)).
103.
104.

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1977).
Id. at 418 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enterp., 390 U.S. 400, 402
Id.
Id. at 421.
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Hughes v. Rowe,'0 5 the plaintiff, a state penitentiary inmate, lost
his case and was directed to pay the defendant $400 in counsel
fees. After reciting the standard for defendant claims for attorney's fees enunciated for Title VII cases, the Court determined:
Although arguably a different standard might be applied in a civil
rights action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, we can perceive no reason for
applying a less stringent standard. The plaintiffs action must be
meritless in the sense that it is groundless or without foundation.
The fact that a plaintiff may ultimately lose his case is not in itself a
sufficient justification for the assessment of fees .... These limitations apply10 6with special force in actions initiated by uncounseled
prisoners.
This reasoning is further confirmed by the Court's recent ruling
in Hensley v. Eckerhart.1° 7 A footnote in that case reiterates the
standard derived from the Title VII case and applies it to Section 1988.108 In practice, the standard for the award of attorney's
fees to a prevailing defendant under the Fees Act is not likely to
be appreciably different from the common law exception to the
American rule for abuse of judicial process.
Prevailing
The 94th Congress obviously intended to include within the
meaning of "prevailing party" the plaintiff who obtains the final
judgment of the court in his favor on each contested issue.
When the plaintiff wins only some of his issues, or when he wins
an interlocutory motion, or when the case is resolved by settlement out of court, or the case is dismissed as moot due to some
extrajudicial act, the intent of Congress is less clear and, consequently, often litigated. The extent to which the plaintiff must
prevail is the question posed by the first of these questions.
One test for the eligibility of a partially successful plaintiff
for fees has been plainly enunciated by the First Circuit. In Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 0 9 the First Circuit held that plaintiffs who obtain favorable judgment on some, but not all, of the claims
before the court prevail "if they succeed on any significant issue
in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties
sought in bringing suit."'110 Requiring only some success on any
significant issue is a lenient standard. For instance, the plaintiffs in Familias Unidas v. Briscoe"' sought ten thousand dollars in damages to redress enforcement of an allegedly
105. 449 U.S. 5 (1980).
106. Id. at 14-15.
107. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S. Ct. 1933 (1983).

108. Id. at 1937 n. 2.
109. 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978).

110. Id. at 278-79.
111. 619 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1980).
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unconstitutional state law. On appeal, the plaintiff was awarded
only nominal damages and a declaratory judgment that the statfound to have
ute was unconstitutional. Nonetheless, they were 112
"prevailed" sufficiently to receive attorney's fees.
An alternative test for the degree of success necessary to
"prevail" was articulated by the Fifth Circuit in Taylor v. Sterett.113 To prevail under that formulation, a party must have been
"successful on the central issue as exhibited by the fact that he
has acquired the primary relief sought."'114 In Taylor, the plaintiff sued to enforce an earlier court order requiring changes in
jail conditions. Since the order was already being carried out,
the plaintiff could not demonstrate that he had obtained compliance with the order in any way other than what was already underway. Prevailing on the "central issue" of the case is certainly
a more demanding standard than achieving "some of the benefit" sought in the complaint.
In Hensley, the Supreme Court acknowledged this split in
the circuits by noting that the standard for prevailing "has been
framed in various ways. 1" 5 The Court then cited the Nadeau
standard as a "typical formulation," which it further characterized as "generous."' 1 6 The Supreme Court did not decide which
standard was proper, however, and it failed to resolve the conflict. Hensley did set standards for deciding when partial success may "reasonably" be compensated, which should
overshadow the significance of the prevailing test altogether.
Interlocutory orders present another issue with respect to
"prevailing." In general, a party who prevails on some trial issue
short of a final judgment is not eligible for attorney's fees. The
1 7
case which best represents this rule is Hanrahanv. Hampton,
in which the plaintiffs sought fees on the basis of a victory on
appeal which reversed the directed verdicts against them and
returned their case to the discovery stage. The Supreme Court
held that they had not yet prevailed in the sense necessary to
obtain fees. 1' 8 It is evident that the nature of the preliminary
112. Id. at 406 (the amount of fees, however, was limited to work performed only on issues on which plaintiffs were successful).
113. 640 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1981).
114. Id. at 669.

115. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1939 (1983).
116. Id.
117. 446 U.S. 754 (1980).
118. The Court determined that:
Congress intended to permit the interim award of counsel fees only

when a party has prevailed on the merits of at least some of his claims.
For only in that event has there been a determination of the substantial
rights of the parties, which Congress determined was a necessary foundation for departing from the usual rule in this country that each party
is to bear the expense of his own attorney ... As is true of other proce-
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ruling can affect the eligibility for fees. If the matter decided
pendente lite is evidentiary or procedural, it does not qualify the
winning plaintiff for fees. If, on the other hand, the preliminary
ruling provides the plaintiff with some of the benefits sought on
the merits of the case, it may warrant a fee award. In Battle v.
Anderson,119 for example, the district court in the midst of a
complicated procedural case issued a "remedial" order requiring the state to change some aspects of its penal system. On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit remanded the orders to the district
court with instructions that granted the plaintiffs some of their
requested benefits. At the same time, the court granted the requested attorney's fees on the basis of the Nadeau standard.
The plaintiff had achieved some of the benefits sought at the
120
time of bringing the suit.

Settlement, of course, terminates a lawsuit short of the final
judgment generally necessary for a fees award. The Senate Report, however, anticipated settlements, and determined that "for
purposes of the award of counsel fees, parties may be considered to have prevailed when they vindicate rights through a consent judgment or without formally obtaining relief."' 121 Citing
this language, the Supreme Court determined that "It]he fact
that the respondent prevailed through a settlement rather than
through litigation does not weaken her claim to fees."'122 This
does not mean, however, that a district court will not carefully
scrutinize a settlement to ascertain if attorney's fees are
123
warranted.
The effect of fee shifting on settlements has stimulated considerable legal commentary. To substantiate their contention
that section 1988 discourages settlements, Professors Fioretti
and Convery stated that, "the more hours the attorney spends
on the case, the higher his potential fee award. The motivation
then is not to settle, but to proceed to trial, where the hourly
dural or evidentiary rulings, these determinations may affect the disposition on the merits, but were themselves not matters on which a party
would prevail.
Id. at 758-59.
119. 457 F. Supp. 719 (E.D. Okla. 1978).
120. 614 F.2d 251, 258 (10th Cir. 1980).
121. S. REP., supra note 27, at 5.
122. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980).
123. In Parker v. Matthews, the Court asserted that "to award attorneys'
fees where there has been a settlement. . . must be determined by a close
scrutiny of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the settlement, focusing particularly on the necessity for bringing the act and whether the
party is the successful party with respect to the central issue." 411 F. Supp.
1059,1064 (D.D.C. 1976), afftd, 561 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1977). This holding is in
harmony with the concept of gaining the central benefits sought when the
suit was filed.
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rates are even higher."'124 Their article further argued that the
disincentive to settle harms both the plaintiff and the interests
of judicial administration. According to the authors:
The purpose of the Civil Rights Act as a whole is to protect those
who have suffered a constitutional tort. It naturally follows that if
an early settlement is possible, the plaintiff, the protected party
under the Act, should be compensated swiftly. However, a plaintiff's attorney, who during the early phase of the litigation has spent
relatively few hours in preparation, may lack incentive to settle until compensable hours have reached a significant level. Thus, the
overriding goal of the Civil Rights Act is thwarted and litigation is
encouraged. The already crowded125courts are further congested, so
that the taxpayer suffers as well.
Justice Rehnquist was recently joined by Justice O'Connor
in a dissent to a denial of certiorari that raised some important
issues about the "prevailing" requirement and its effect on settlement. The Justices commented on the case of Young v.
Kenley,12 6 where the plaintiff alleged discrimination had cost
her a job for which she had applied. When she applied and
passed the required examination, she was accepted for the position. At that point, the case was settled and the plaintiff claimed
extensive legal fees. The Justices noted that fees should not be
provided "if the discernible benefit was conferred gratuitously
by the defendant or was taken simply to avoid further litigation
expenses."' 127 This commentary about settlement to avoid legal
fees liability underscores the comment of the Attorney General
of Arizona, Robert Corbin:
The potential burden of having to pay attorneys' fees often affects
the states' or defendants' ability to litigate or defend a case fully in
trial or on appeal. Therefore, it is not uncommon, in a close case,
for the defendant to capitulate
early in order to minimize that attor128
neys' fees liability."'
Although a settlement is a voluntary act of the defendant,
its direct relation to the lawsuit generally removes any question
about the source of the defendant's motivation for conferring
some benefit on the plaintiff. A more complex issue arises when
the defendant takes some voluntary act apparently unrelated to
the suit which moots the cause of action. In such a case, the
court must ascertain if there is a causal relationship between
the lawsuit and the defendant's extrajudicial action. In the
words of the Fifth Circuit, "a civil rights plaintiff may not collect
124. Fioretti & Convery, Attorney's Fees Under the Civil Rights Act-A
Time for Change, 16 J. MAR. L. REV. 261, 276-77 (1983).
125. Id. at 278.
126. 445 U.S. 961 (1980).
127. Id. at 967.
128. 129 CONG. REC. S.632 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983) (statement of Senator
Hatch).
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attorney's fees for demanding what the defendant would have
done anyway."'129 In Williams v. Miller,130 the Eighth Circuit
stated the rule governing intervening voluntary acts of the defendant concisely. The court in Williams determined "[w] hen
defendants moot the suit by voluntary compliance the question
becomes whether the suit was the 'catalyst' that brought about
compliance.., if it was, the plaintiffs are prevailing parties for
13 1
attorney's fees award purposes."
The Fifth Circuit, in Robinson v. Kimbrough,132 emphasized
three facts for deciding when a lawsuit was the catalyst for the
defendant's action. The three factors to consider are the relief
obtained, the chronology of events, and the role of litigation in
spurring the defendant to action. Several cases demonstrate
how this test is applied.
In Stewart v. Hannon,133 a school board expeditiously withdrew test scores when it independently ascertained that they
were discriminatory; no fees were awarded for the suit mooted
by that withdrawal. In this instance, the defendants had undertaken a review of the test scores for civil rights sufficiency
before the suit was fied. This chronology suggested that the adjudication had not been the catalyst. In the unusual case of
Coen v. Harrison County School Board,34 the Ku Klux Klan
sued to receive permission to use school facilities for a meeting.
At trial, the judge recommended that the Ku Klux Klan reapply
for permission after assuring the school officials that no anti-social behavior would take place. The Klan took his advice, posted
a bond to cover any potential property damage, and was granted
use of the building for an uneventful rally. This chain of events
did not make the Klan a prevailing party, however, because "it
was the plaintiffs, not the defendants, who acceded to the other
35
party's terms."'
The catalyst doctrine has been harshly criticized. For example, Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman of the Senate Constitution Subcommittee and author of legislation to reform section
1988 noted:
[Slome courts' strong emphasis on chronology-that is, the fact
that the plaintiffs case was pending when the Government
changed the policy which mooted the litigation-for establishing
that the suit was a catalyst for the Government's action has led
many local governments to fear making changes and improvements
129. William v. Leatherbury, 672 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1982).

130. 620 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1980).
131. Id. at 202.

132. 540 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 620 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1980).
133. 675 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1982).
134. 638 F.2d 24 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982).

135. Id. at 26.
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in its policy lest it become liable for fees in a pending suit. 13 6
Accordingly, a provision in S.141, one of Senator Hatch's reform
bills would deny fees "where the court finds that the pendency
137
of litigation was not a material factor for such change."'
Some cases dealing with intervening legislative action
which moots a case present a particularly difficult causal determination. Since a legislature's motives are as varied as the
many members that comprise such bodies, settling on a single
catalyst for an enactment is at best difficult. Nonetheless, some
courts have awarded fees on the basis of an intervening legislative act. 138 For example, in DeMeir v. Gondles, 39 the plaintiffs
voluntarily dismissed their claim after the state legislature enacted a statute that solved the problems that had precipitated
the suit, yet they were awarded fees. The same circuit suggested, in another case, however, that reading a desire to resolve
court cases into legislative actions "might constitute an impermissible inquiry into legislative motive."'140 Commenting on this
problem and the leniency of the Nadeau "some benefits" standard, the National Association of Attorneys General concluded
that even though section 1988 was intended only for prevailing
4
parties, subsequent court decisions have undercut this goal.1 '
According to the Association, these decisions included situations "where the party awarded fees has actually lost the case
1 42
on the merits or failed to succeed in any meaningful sense."'
PotentialLegislative Reform of the Concept of Prevailing
Parties
The standard for determining when a party is "prevailing"
would profit from clarification. The current discrepancy between the Nadeau and Taylor standards should be resolved
more definitively than attempted by the Supreme Court. A middle ground between the two standards would require a party to
prevail on any significant issue in litigation. This is the first part
of the Nadeau test. It is less demanding than requiring victory
on a "central issue," but more demanding than the "some benefit" part of Nadeau. This would be in line with other fee shifting
statutes, such as the Freedom of Information Act, where the
136. See supra note 128.
137. S. 141, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
138. See Armstrong v. Reed, 462 F. Supp. 496 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (Emer-

gency School Aid Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1617, gave court discretion to award attorney's fees).
139. 676 F.2d 92 (4th Cir. 1982).
140. Bly v. McLeod, 605 F.2d 134, 138 n. 6 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 928 (1980).
141. NAAG REP., supra note 48, at 17-18.
142. Id.
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courts have required plaintiffs to "substantially" prevail. 143 A
more definitive test for prevailing is necessary in light of the
Act's legislative history. The prevailing requirement was included to deter meritless suits. As this requirement erodes, the
disincentive to pursue meritless claims also evaporates.
With regard to the "catalyst" doctrine, the "material factor"
test contained in the Hatch bill is derived from the Third Circuit
case of Morrison v. Ayoob. 144 In that case, a challenge to district
justices' practice of sending petty offenders to jail without access to counsel was rendered moot by the voluntary cessation of
such practice. The court determined that the plaintiff "is a prevailing party if the action was a material factor in bringing about
the defendant's action.' 45 This test provides a measuring rod
for determining when one motivation, namely the lawsuit, out of
many potential motivations for a change in defendant's policy, is
sufficiently important to warrant the award of attorney's fees.
Such a legislative codification would ensure that the chronology
test does not become the sole criterion for applying the catalyst
doctrine.
S. 141 also contains a provision denying fees "for that part of
litigation subsequent to a declined offer of settlement when
such offer was as substantially favorable to the prevailing party
as the relief ultimately awarded by the court."'146 This provision
obviously serves to encourage reasonable settlements. After accepting a settlement under this provision, the plaintiff would
have prevailed and counsel fees for work up to that point would
be granted by the court. Defendants would have a clear incentive to offer a fair settlement because they could thus protect
themselves against fee judgments. In his introductory statement for S. 141, Senator Hatch dealt with some of the contentions against this concept:
It has been argued that his proposal would place the entire risk
upon the plaintiffs attorney and would "place the attorney and his
client in a conflict-the attorney may feel compelled to encourage
the plaintiff to accept a less than adequate settlement, rather than
risk denial of fees for litigating to a judgment." But this argument
ignores the fact that there presently exists a substantial risk and a
conflict of interest for the plaintiff's attorney-presently the attorney can settle and receive his fees up to that point or he can go
ahead with the suit and risk not winning and thus recover no
fees ....
While this amendment may increase the risk upon the
attorney and the conflict with his client, the increase is a matter of
143. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (E) (1982) ("court may assess against the United
States reasonable attorneys fees ... in any case ... in which the complainant has substantially prevailed.").
144. 627 F.2d 669 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981).
145. Id. at 671.
146. See supra note 137.
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degree and not of kind. Consideration by the attorney of his potential fee is currently injected throughout the litigation by the Fees
Act itself. I feel that the benefits of the proposed settlement provision far outweigh the costs: First, the plaintiffs, often the forgotten
figure in this issue, will get a quick resolution of their claim rather
than having to possibly wait years; second, court congestion from
these cases will be reduced and the notion that each of these disputes must go through the grossly inefficient process of full litigation will be lessened; third, local governments will be able to
protect themselves from costly fee judgments; and fourth, the attorney will recover his fees for his efforts up to the settlement and can
the defendant's offer not
still recover fees for the entire suit should
147
be reasonable and he later prevails.
FEE COMPUTATION
The legislative history of the Fee Awards Act provides some
guidance about the computation methods preferred by Congress. The Senate Report provides "that the amount of the fees
awarded. . be governed by the same standards which prevail
in other types of equally complex federal litigation, such as antitrust .... ,,148
This language endorses two fee computation
methods: the Johnson factors and the lodestar method used in
antitrust cases. Every Circuit has utilized one of these two approaches or a combination of both, but the trend toward exclusive use of some variant of the lodestar method has been
recently endorsed by the Supreme Court. 149
The Johnson approach to fee computation is less a method
than it is a listing of factors to be weighed and applied according
to the discretion of the judge. The Fifth Circuit derived the
twelve factors of the Johnson approach from the eight guidelines
for client billing established by the American Bar Association
Code of Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rule 2-106.150
The Johnson factors include time and labor required, difficulty
of the case, experience and skill of the attorney, the attorney's
customary fees, the amount of the claim and degree of success,
and awards in similar cases.
As indicated by its Senate Report, Congress seems to have
anticipated that these factors would not provide methodological
guidance for the application of the numerous factors. It there147. See supra note 127.
148. S. REP., supra note 27, at 6. For the appropriate standards, see Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1974). They are
correctly applied in such cases as Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680
(N.D. Cal. 1974); Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 E.P.D. 9444 (C.D. Cal.
1974); and Swann v. Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 66 F.R.D. 483 (W.D. N.C.
1975). These cases have resulted in fees which are adequate to attract competent counsel, but which do not produce windfalls to attorneys.

149. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1939 (1983).
150. Id. at 1937 n. 3.
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fore recommended that these factors be "properly applied" by
reliance on the lodestar method. Two of the three cases mentioned by the Senate report-Stanford Daily v. Zurcher'51 and
David v. County of Los Angeles,' 52-applied the lodestar
method. Under the lodestar method, a court simply multiplies
the number of hours worked on a case by the counsel's customary hourly rate to obtain a lodestar sum. This essentially acknowledges two of the primary Johnson factors. The court then
adjusts the fee after consideration of some of the other factors in
Johnson. This second step of the lodestar approach has recently
been sharply circumscribed by the Supreme Court. 153 Prior to
these recent clarifications, these additional factors were known
in some circuits as contingency or quality factors. A contingency factor took into account the likelihood of success at the
outset of the suit and rewarded the attorney with a higher award
for achieving success with a risky case. A quality factor recognized the quality of the attorney's performance in relation to the
difficulty of the case and was invoked to either increase or diminish the fee.
Prior to the recent guidance of the Supreme Court, most of
the circuits generally employed the lodestar approach, but even
among those that had adopted this method, the variations from
circuit to circuit were often substantial. 5 4 Other circuits ad151.
152.
153.
154.

64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
8 E.P.D. 9444 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
Blum v. Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 1547 (1984).
The First Circuit initially instructed its district courts to apply the

Johnson factors in Souza v. Southworth, 564 F.2d 609 (1st Cir. 1977), but later

adopted the lodestar approach in Furtado v. Bishop, 635 F.2d 915 (1st Cir.
1980). The Second Circuit adopted the lodestar method early in Detroit v.

Grinnell, 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974), which was recently modified into a
"cost plus" formulation for fees requested by public interest organizations
in New York State Ass'n. for Retarded Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136 (2d
Cir. 1983). Carey was recently questioned by the Supreme Court in Blum v.
Stenson, No. 81-1374 (S. Ct. Mar. 21, 1984). The Third Circuit first formulated the lodestar approach in Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973). The Fourth Circuit

recently adopted the lodestar method in Anderson v. Morris, 658 F.2d 246
(4th Cir. 1981). The Fifth Circuit originally fashioned the Johnson factors,
but has urged that they be applied flexibly according to a lodestar-like approach. See Cooper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolf Coors, 624 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1980).

The Sixth Circuit favors a modified lodestar approach. Northcross v. Board
of Educ. of Memphis, 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911

(1980). The Seventh Circuit prefers the Johnson approach as determined in

Muscare v. Quinn, 614 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1980). The Eighth Circuit permits

use of either the lodestar, Cleverly v. Western Elec. Co., 594 F.2d 638 (8th

Cir. 1979), or the Johnson factors, Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975). The Ninth

Circuit in the past has permitted use of a variety of fee computation methods, but recently has given at least some consideration to the Johnson factors in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, 526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 951 (1975). The Tenth Circuit apparently favors the Johnson factors.

Francia v. White, 594 F.2d 778 (10th Cir. 1979). The Eleventh Circuit has
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hered to the basic Johnson approach. The lack of a single test
prompted considerable unease. 15 5 A survey about attorney's
fees in class action suits performed by the Federal Judicial
Center found that judges were overwhelmingly convinced that
"fee abuses are a serious problem."' 156 Professor Arthur Miller,
who performed that survey, noted that "[t Ihe feeling that attorneys reap exorbitant fees appears to run deep" and concluded
that "reform of the fee awards standards may be a logical response to a problem widely thought to exist."' 1 7 One possible
reason for this widespread sentiment is that "the high degree of
subjectivity involved in most fee decisions is unhealthy for both
the legal profession and for the conduct of litigation.' 58 The
City Attorney from Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on behalf of the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers noted one final frustration in that "[t] he liberal award of fees ... increased by the use
of multipliers, and having no relation to the amount of damages,
if any, recovered encourages protracted litigation because there
is no penalty for litigating claims unless they are clearly vexatious or frivolous."'1 59 To substantiate the claims that litigants
often receive awards disproportionate to the degree of success,
160
critics of the Fees Act have cited cases like Skoda v. Fontani,
in which the plaintiff won one dollar in damages and was
awarded over six thousand in fees. In Rivera v. City of Riverside,16 1 the plaintiff won $33,350 in damages and received nearly
$250,000 in fees. Another example is Grendel'sDen, Inc. v. Gooddeferred to the Fifth Circuit's rulings in Bonner v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d
1206 (11th Cir. 1981). The District of Columbia Circuit after following the
Johnson approach for years, switched recently to the lodestar approach in
Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

155. For instance, the National Association of Attorneys General study
stated:
With different approaches being applied by the different circuits and
even by various courts within each circuit, parties . . . are subject to
different approaches and hence different results. Courts disagree on
what factors should be applied, how they should be applied, and even
what they mean ....
As a result, in cases decided between 1974 and

1979, hourly rates awarded to civil rights attorneys varied by 685
percent.
NAAG REP., supra note 48, at 28. See also Comment, Calculationof a Reasonable Award of Attorneys' Fees Under the Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of
1976, 13 J. MAR. L. REV. 331, 378 (1980).
156. A. MILLER, ATrORNEYS' FEES IN CLAss ACTIONs 306 (Federal Judicial
Center 1980).

157. Id. at 307.
158. Berger, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees: What is Reasonable?126 U.
PA. L. REV. 281, 293 (1977).
159. Hearings,supra note 55, at 94-95.
160. 646 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1981).
161. 679 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1982).
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win 162 where a Massachusetts zoning law was declared unconstitutional and the attorney requested $331,441 in fees at an
effective hourly rate of $412.50 an hour for his services.
Perhaps due to its awareness of some of these dislocations
in the application of section 1988, the Supreme Court recently
delivered two significant opinions providing more definition for
the computation of fees. As mentioned above, nine of the cir163
cuits were employing some variation of the lodestar method.
In Hensley v. Eckerhart,'6 this trend was clearly commended to
the rest of the circuits when the Court noted that "[t]he most
useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable
fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.' 65 Less than a year
later the Court made this direction even more obligatory by
holding that "[t]he initial estimate of a reasonable attorney's fee
is properly calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonably hourly
rate.' 66 This guidance has sufficiently clarified the intent of the
Fees Act to ensure nationwide application of a lodestar method.
This alone will not reduce the subjectivity involved in discerning
"hours reasonably expended" or "reasonable hourly rates," but
it will replace an inconsistent process for fee computation with a
uniform methodology.
Bonuses and Multipliers
Awarding of bonuses for contingency or quality on top of
the lodestar sum was inaugurated by the original lodestar case,
Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp.167 This part of the lodestar formulation has

grown dramatically. 6 8 For example, the $2,204,534 award mentioned earlier was the result of a 3.5 multiplier. 69 In another
case, a fee award of over $88,000 was increased by fifty percent to
over $132,000 on the basis of quality service provided on issues
the court agreed were not especially novel.170 Other cases have
162. 495 F. Supp. 761 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 662 F.2d 88, affd on reh'g, 662 F.2d

102 (lst Cir. 1981). For some of the public commentary surrounding this
case, see New York Times, Dec. 14, 1983 at A 22 and Washington Post, Dec.
16, 1983 at A 22.
163. See supra note 151.
164. 103 S. Ct. 1933 (1983).

165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 1939.
Blum v. Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 1544 (1984).
487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973).
See Leusdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90
YALE LJ.473 (1981).
169. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
170. Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 491 F. Supp. 958, 965-66 (E.D.
Pa. 1980).
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multiplied the lodestar amount by 2,171 by 1.75,172 or otherwise
"reasonsignificantly enhanced what is supposed to constitute
173
able rates times reasonable hours" in the first place.
In Blum v. Stenson,174 the Supreme Court questioned the
justification for such upward adjustments. Stenson had requested $118,968 in fees, figured by compensating his 809 hours
of work at a rate of from $95 to $105 per hour and then adding a
fifty percent bonus ($39,656) to reward him for the "quality of
representation, the complexity of the issues, the riskiness of
success, and the great benefit ... achieved." 17 5 Before turning
to these specific reasons for the bonus, the Court examined the
legislative history of the Fees Act and concluded that the basic
lodestar sum "normally provides a 'reasonable' attorney's fee
within the meaning of the statute.' 1 76 Turning next to the specific reasons for Stenson's upward adjustment, the Court found
that they "do not withstand examination.' 1 77 With respect to
the complexity and novelty of the case, the Court found that
these factors "presumably were fully reflected in the number of
billable hours recorded by counsel and thus do not warrant an
upward adjustment.' 78 Since it is axiomatic that a complex
case will take more time to prepare than an easy one, the attorney time expended should adequately compensate a lawyer for
this factor. In regard to the quality factor, the Court opined that
there are instances where the experience and special skills of
the attorney should be a factor in the fees awarded. Accordingly, "this expertise should be reflected in the reasonableness
of the hourly rates.' 79 The excellence of the benefits achieved,
"generally will be subsumed within other factors used to calculate a reasonable fee, it normally should not provide an independent basis for increasing the fee award."' 8 0
This leaves only one further basis for a bonus, contingency
or the riskiness of success. In Blum, the plaintiff never identi171. Graves v. Barnes, 700 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1983); Wells v. Hutchinson,
499 F. Supp. 174 (E.D. Tex. 1980); Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 481 F. Supp. 776

(E.D. Pa. 1979).
172. West v. Redman, 530 F. Supp. 546 (D. Del. 1982).
173. For a well articulated criticism of this aspect of the lodestar methodology, see Circuit Judge M. Wilkey's dissent in Copeland v. Marshall, 641
F.2d 880, 908 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Wilkey, J., dissenting) ("In our colleagues
lodestar opinion, the path of attorney's fees in Title VII litigation is easy to
discern. It is Up, Up, and Away! It is Per Calculos As Astra.").
174. Blum v. Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 154 (1984).
175. Id. at 1545.

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 1548.
Id.
Id. at 1548-49.
Id. at 1549.
Id.
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fled any risks associated with the litigation, nor "claim [ed] that
the risk of nonpayment required an upward adjustment to provide a reasonable fee."'181 The record did not support such a
finding. The Court raised a further question, however, of
"whether the risk of not being the prevailing party... may ever
182
justify an upward adjustment."'
This question is perceptive; it focuses attention on the intent of the Fees Act. Only "prevailing parties" are to qualify for
a "reasonable fee" in the first place. This "prevailing" threshold
was the mechanism chosen by Congress to deter meritless litigation. Supplying a bonus for accepting marginal or risky cases
would certainly be at odds with this policy. In fact, a contingency bonus could attract competent counsel away from prosecuting clear violations of rights in favor of cases with a higher
potential award. If the contingency argument is based on the
notion that fees in this risky case may offset expenses of other
unsuccessful suits, the problem of encouraging marginal litigation is compounded by the reasonable question of "why the subsidy [for unsuccessful litigation] should come from the
defendant in another case."'183 The summation of these points
on contingency or quality bonuses was emphasized repeatedly
84
by the Court in Blum.
Blum and Hensley have certainly clarified some of the most
important issues that led to the widespread dissatisfaction with
the computation of section 1988 fees. Each of these clarifications, however, left some questions unanswered. Those unanswered questions are not the product of the Court's irresolution,
but of Congress's failure to provide discernible standards. In
fact, Congress has not adequately defined the limits of judicial
discretion in making awards under section 1988. In the context
of another fee shifting statute, Congress was careful to provide a
mechanism defining the maximum hourly rate for compensating
counsel. The Equal Access to Justice Act contains a $75 hourly
rate cap on all awards provided under its terms. 8 5 This supplies
adequate compensation to attract competent counsel, which is
181. Id at 1550.

182. Id at 1550 n. 17.
183. Leubsdorf, supra note 168, at 488-89.
184. "[W] e reiterate what was said in Hensley- 'where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully compensatory

fee. Normally this will encompass all hours reasonably expended on the
litigation, and indeed in some cases of exceptional success an enhancement
award may be justifled.'" Blum, 104 S. Ct. at 1550 (quoting Hensley v. Eck-

erhart, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1940 (1983)). What the Court means by "exceptional
success" justifying an "enhancement" after undermining each of the foundations for a bonus is uncertain, but something more than "excellent results" is clearly required.
185. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1) (A) (1980) (repealed Oct. 1, 1984).
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the stated purpose of the Fees Act, without providing windfalls
for attorneys. Consistency might dictate a similar provision for
other fee shifting statutes. The Equal Access to Justice Act subjects the federal government to liability, while section 1988 generally subjects the state and local governments to liability for
fees. Since Congress has provided a cap to protect its own treasury, consistency might dictate a similar regard for other governmental entities.
Compensationfor Unsuccessful Claims: Issue Splitting
The Supreme Court's recent ruling in the case of Hensley v.
Eckerhart 86 has resolved major issues regarding the partial success problem or the question of issue splitting in fee computaof
tion. As discussed earlier, failing to prevail on all causes 187
action does not make a plaintiff ineligible for attorney's fees.
Prior to Hensley, there was some confusion about whether a
plaintiff should be compensated for issues on which he did not
prevail.
Basing their reasoning on the eligibility rule for a partially
successful plaintiff, some courts have held that prevailing on
any single issue guarantees a recovery for time spent on all issues in the case. 188 Northcross v. Board of Education'8 9 exemplifies this line of cases:
The fact that some of the time was spent in pursuing research on
issues which was ultimately unproductive, rejected by the court, or
mooted ...is wholly irrelevant. So long as the party has prevailed
on the case as a whole the district courts are to allow compensation
for hours expended on unsuccessful research . . . [otherwise we
would] discourage
innovative and vigorous lawyering in a changing
190
area of the law.
This rule, however, could produce unanticipated results. For instance, it could "encourage civil rights plaintiffs to pad their
complaints with multiple, meritless claims."' 91 It also could discourage early settlements because attorneys are likely to be
compensated for all time spent on a case if they prevail on any
single claim.
Another line of cases, however, stated that plaintiffs should
not recover fees for pursuing unsuccessful claims. In Hughes v.
186. 103 S. Ct. 1933 (1983).
187. See supra notes 96-120 and accompanying text.

188. Busche v. Burkee, 649 F.2d 509 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897
(1981); Reproductive Servs. v. Freeman, 614 F.2d 585 (8th Cir.), vacated, 449
U.S. 809, on remand,634 F.2d 1134 (1980); Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 610 F.2d
46 (lst Cir. 1979); E. LARSON, supra note 14, at 177-87.
189. 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980).
190. Id. at 636.
191. NAAG REP., supra note 48, at 20.
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Repko, 192 the Third Circuit opined that "the fee-petitioner cannot be treated as the prevailing party to the extent he has been
unsuccessful in asserting a claim. . . .Any other interpretation
would run counter to the spirit of the Award Act provision that
19 3
attorney's fees should be awarded to the 'prevailing' party."'
94
Nor was the Third Circuit alone in reaching this conclusion.
Between the extremes of allowing and disallowing fees for
unsuccessful claims, other circuit court opinions had suggested
basing the fee determination on the nature of those claims or on
the likelihood that work on unsuccessful claims contributed to
any success achieved. 195 Thus the stage was set for some resolution of this major fees question.
The fees sought in Hensley sprang from a constitutional
challenge to the conditions in a Missouri State Mental Hospital.
The plaintiffs requested a total fee award of "somewhere between $195,000 and $225,000" for work done on all counts of the
lawsuit, some of which they had voluntarily dismissed and
others of which they did not win.196 The Supreme Court clarified first that the issue with respect to "prevailing" was properly
addressed by the standard articulated by the First Circuit in Nadeau v. Helgemoe.197 The Court then clarified that claim-splitting was a fee computation issue and determined that the
Nadeau rule "is a generous formulation that brings the plaintiff
only across the statutory threshold. It remains for the district
court to determine what fee is reasonable.' "198
After discussing several factors to be considered in making
a determination of "reasonableness," the Court noted that
"It] here remain other considerations that may lead the district
court to adjust the fee upward or downward, including the 'results obtained.' "199 Noting that distinct claims in the same suit
may be entirely unrelated to one another, the Court determined
that work on an unsuccessful claim cannot be deemed to have
been expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved. The
Court concluded that the congressional intent required treating
200
these claims as if they had been asserted in different lawsuits.
When a litigant succeeds on some claims that are sufficiently re192.
193.
194.
Quinn,

578 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1978).
Id. at 487.
Bartholomew v. Watson, 665 F.2d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 1982); Muscare v.
614 F.2d 577, 579-81 (7th Cir. 1980).

195. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1938-39 n. 5 (1983), for a
listing of cases with different approaches to unsuccessful claims.

196. Id. at 1936-37.
197. 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978).
198. Hensley at 1938-39.

199. Id. at 1939.
200. Id.
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lated to unsuccessful claims to make it difficult to consider them
separately, however, "the court should focus on the significance
of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the
hours reasonably expended on litigation. '20 1 The basic principle
is that fees may be reduced on the basis of claim-by-claim success unless the claims are not severable.
Some new questions are created by the answer to the old.
Litigation will undoubtedly arise over what relationship between claims is necessary to escape the severance requirement.
Another aspect of the Hensley case likely to lead to more litigation is the Court's comment that "[w]here a plaintiff has obtained excellent results. . . the fee award should not be reduced
simply because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention
raised in the lawsuit. '20 2 On one level, this excellence principle
is in harmony with the Court's objective in the Hensley case,
namely "clarify[ing] the proper relationship of the results obtained to an award. '20 3 Excellence is a qualitative "result"
which a judge is uniquely qualified to discern within the discretion granted by the Act to set "reasonable" fees. On the other
hand, rewarding excellence is not related to the principle of
"prevailing" which underlies the quantitative results method
suggested by the claim-by-claim severance language of the opinion. What is a district court required to do when a litigant does
excellent work on an unsuccessful claim? The district court will
undoubtedly be divided over encouraging excellence in bringing
innovative causes on the one hand and discouraging mere experimentation and frivolous claims on the other. In the absence
of clarifying legislation, Justice Brennan's warning will undoubtedly prove correct: "appellate scrutiny of issues like those
in this case also generates a steady stream of opinions, each requiring yet another to harmonize it with the one before or the
' 2 °4
one after."
Duplication of Effort
The duplication of effort issue has its genesis in language
from Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express. 20 5 In Johnson the
Court determined "[ijf more than one attorney is involved, the
possibility of duplication of effort along with the proper utilization of time should be scrutinized. The time of two or three lawyers in a courtroom when one would do, may obviously be
201. Id
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1951 (Brennen, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
205. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).

1984]

Attorney's Fees Reform

discounted. '20 6 Thus, a district court enjoys the discretion to reduce the number of compensable hours in a fee request to account for duplicative efforts. 20 7 On the other hand, complex
litigation will often justify more than one attorney's expenditure
20 8
of effort.
PotentialLegislative Reform of Fee Computation
As mentioned earlier, the Equal Access to Justice Act sets a
$75 cap on attorney fee awards. A maximum rate of compensation for civil fee shifting statutes would not only be consistent
with the Equal Access Act, but would also reasonably attract
competent counsel without providing windfalls for attorneys.
Mr. Jonathan Rose, former Assistant Attorney General in charge
of the Office of Legal Policy, has stated that such a cap for federal fee shifting statutes would make awards "fairer and more
predictable. '20 9 He added that "[a] fixed $75 per hour rate is
well above what the federal government pays its own attorneys,
and should be sufficient to attract competent counsel. '2 10 Additionally, he noted that a cap would relieve the courts of continually attempting to determine a reasonable rate and would also
eliminate the windfall awards. 2 1' This comment about the comparative rate of compensation for government lawyers and civil
rights advocates recalls the dicta in the Johnson case that Congress did not intend to make "the private attorney general's po'212
sition so lucrative as to ridicule the public attorney general.
Mr. Rose's remark about predictability supports the likelihood
that a cap would narrow the issues with respect to compensation of prevailing plaintiffs' counsel and result in prompt settlements of fee request issues.
A maximum hourly rate for counsel fee awards would not
preclude a court from making specific findings that warrant a reduction in fees. For instance, if the attorney in question generally earns a lower rate, this would certainly argue for a reduction
from the cap. In addition, other circumstances might warrant a
downward adjustment. In this vein, the Equal Access to Justice
Act contains language permitting reduction where the plaintiff
is found to have unreasonably prolonged the outcome of the
206. Id at 717.
207. Miles v. Sampson, 675 F.2d 5 (lst Cir. 1982).
208. Planned Parenthood Assoc. of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848
(8th Cir. 1981); Tasby v. Estes, 651 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1981).
209. Rose, supra note 14, at 16.
210. Id. at 16-17.
211. Id.
212. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 716 (5th Cir.
1974).
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case. 213 The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act allows reductions where no bona fide attorney-client relationship is evident
and where the efforts expended on the case are excessive with
regard to the nature of the adjudication. 2 14 A fee request wholly
disproportionate to the monetary or injunctive results of the
case could also justify reduction. 215 Finally, it should be clear
that any listing of reduction factors is not exclusive; judicial discretion on a case by case basis may dictate reductions for a variety of reasons, including, for example, some of the issues raised
in the current context of "special circumstances. ' 21 6
S. 141, although introduced months prior to the Hensley
case, adopts the conclusion that fees should be awarded on the
basis of a "reasonable market rate for time reasonably spent on
the claims in which the plaintiff prevailed. '217 This codifies the
Hensley conclusion that the lodestar methodology was intended
by Congress to effect the Johnson standards. It also codifies the
claim splitting concept. Senator Hatch justified his claim splitting provision in advance of Hensley in the following manner:
[TJhe majority of the circuits hold that if, for example, a plaintiff
alleges five separate claims and the court finds that he only prevailed on one of those claims, attorney's fees will be awarded for
the entire litigation despite the fact that the Government won the
vast majority of the claims. This result is anomalous since if the
plaintiff only alleged the four
claims that failed, he would have re2 18
ceived no recovery at all.

A further refinement of the Hatch bill might include the concept
that the plaintiff would need to demonstrate that his attorney's
compensable work was necessary effort expended on prevailing
issues. The inclusion of the necessity concept would preclude
award for redundant or duplicative work and, at the same time,
codify the rule that intervenors should not be compensated for
work which contributes no new understanding to the case.
Senator Hatch's bill also bans the use of "bonuses or multipliers" to compute an attorney's fee award. As mentioned earlier, this proposal seems to be in harmony with the Supreme
Court's Blum v. Stenson2 19 ruling. In that case, the Court could
find no "reasons offered by the District Court to support. . up213. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(C) (1982) (repealed Oct. 1, 1984); 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(3) (1982) (repealed Oct. 1, 1984).
214. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1601(d) (2) (1981).
215. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1941 (1983). (The lodestar formulation in cases of "partial or limited success" may result in an "excessive" fee).
216. See supra notes 56-80 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 137.
218. See supra note 128.
219. 104 S.Ct. 1541 (1984).
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220 The Court left the question of whether
ward adjustment [s] .contingency justifies a bonus only partially answered, but this
remaining issue would be resolved by the Hatch bill. Essentially the bill decides that the formula of reasonable hours times
reasonable rates should be sufficient to produce a reasonable attorney's fee award without additional bonuses.
As provided in the case of Buxton v. Pate,221 a judgment for
substantial monetary damages could justify a percentage reduction, up to 25 percent, in the attorney fees award. This would be
similar to the current provisions of the Federal Tort Claims
Act 2 2 2

and the Social Security Act 223 which provide for compen-

sation of attorneys out of the plaintiffs monetary damages.
CONCLUSION

In the absence of comprehensive legislation that applies
some uniform standards to all fee shifting statutes, such as the
$75 cap on hourly rates, the 197-year-old policy of the American
rule may well continue to be undercut by the multiplication of
statutory exceptions and broad judicial interpretation of the
vague terms of such laws. In past consideration of fee shifting
statutes, Congress has only sparingly deliberated about the
overall policy of the American rule. 2 24 Congress has yet to un-

dertake a comprehensive review of fee shifting statutes. Such a
review would acquire added significance if Congress were to
give special attention to arresting the erosion of the American
rule.
If Congress is to arrest this piecemeal erosion, it must give
serious consideration to the adoption of limits and clarifications
of fee shifting policy that will confine fee awards to the purpose
of reducing financial barriers to meritorious lawsuits. Too often
this purpose has been obscured in the rush to compensate lawyers for quality work or contingency or other factors irrelevant
to the plaintiff's ability to bring his case to court.
Equity also commends attending to fee shifting policy.
220. Id at 1548.
221. 595 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1979).
222. Fed. Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1966).
223. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 406 (1968).
224. The only apparent reference to the American rule during the debate
over the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 amounted to a debating point, rather than a probing analysis of the overall effect of fee shifting statutes on the policies of the rule. 122 CONG. REC. S.16431-16432 (daily
ed. Sept. 22, 1976) (statement of Senator Helms) ("The American judicial
tradition in general disapproves the allowance of attorney's fees to the prevailing party in civil legal actions. The Federal judiciary has been exceedingly cautious in carving out even limited exceptions to this rule.").
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Under the Criminal Justice Act,225 attorneys who represent indi-

gent criminal defendants have received the same rates, $20 per
hour for out-of-court time and $30 per hour for in-court time,
since 1970. At the same time, attorneys seeking awards under
fee shifting statutes are claiming over $400 per hour.2 26 More-

over, the Criminal Justice Act limits attorneys to $1,000 total for
a felony trial, $1,000 for an appeal, and $440 for a misdemeanor.
These compensation limits apply regardless of the complexity
or demands of a particular trial. Congress needs to consider attorney fee policies with an eye to reducing the discrepancy between hourly rates of private attorneys who sue the government
in civil litigation and rates of private attorneys who represent
indigent criminal defendants.
The fee shifting statutes themselves, such as section 1988, in
the sparsity of their guidance for resolving the myriad issues
posed by creating exceptions to the American rule, argue for
their own reform. Legislation is indicated to establish uniform
standards for setting fees at levels sufficient to attract competent counsel without granting windfalls for lawyers.
ADDENDUM

In the few months between submission of this article and its
publication, there have been several important developments
relevant to attorney's fee shifting. On October 9, 1984, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to a case likely to test the ability of a plaintiff to seek fees for state law cases which tangentially raise federal civil rights issues.

227

In Spencer v. South

Commission,22 8

Carolina Tax
the plaintiff challenged as unconstitutional a state tax in state court. The 1937 Federal Tax Injunction Act barred the case from arising in federal court. On
the basis of the same facts involved in the constitutional challenge, the plaintiff added a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and requested fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The state courts provided
substantive relief without reaching the federal cause of action.
Thus, the South Carolina Supreme Court tersely rejected the
fee request: "It may reasonably be inferred that the sole reason
for alleging section 1983 was to justify the allowance of counsel
fees. We do not believe this was contemplated by Congress
225. Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A)(d) (1982).
226. See, e.g., Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. Supp. 403 (C.D. Cal. 1980). (This enor-

mous award amounted to hourly rates between $87.50 and $411.25); Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Goodwin, 495 F. Supp. 761 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 662 F.2d 102
(lst Cir. 1981).

227. See notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
228. 316 S.E. 2d 386 (S.C. 1984), cert. granted,53 U.S.L.W. 3269 (October 9,
1984).
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when it enacted Section 1983 and 1988. ' ' 229 On appeal, the
Supreme Court should decide whether a state court may be
compelled to assume jurisdiction over a section 1983 suit when
existing state law provides adequate remedies without federal
attorney fee entanglements.
On June 27, 1984, Senators Strom Thurmond and Orrin
Hatch, at the request of the Justice Department, introduced the
Legal Fees Equity Act. 230 In his introductory statement, Senator Hatch described this bill, S. 2802, in the following terms:
The overall purpose of this proposal is to provide the courts and
Federal agencies with greater guidance in implementing Federal
fee-shifting statutes. This bill would not deny fees to prevailing
/parties/, but would set standards and procedures to ensure that
such fees are 'reasonable.' An important element of the standards
proposed
by this legislation is a cap of $75 per hour on attorney
23 1
fees.
Besides enacting the same cap currently employed in the Equal
Access to Justice Act, S. 2802 also would adopt the middle
ground position advocated by this article on the question of
232
what degree of success is sufficient to constitute "prevailing;"
employ the "material factor" test from S. 141 for determining
whether a lawsuit has served as a catalyst for administrative or
legislative reform;233 preclude fees for "services performed subsequent to the time of a written settlement offer" found by the
court to have been as favorable as the relief ultimately granted.
Unlike S. 141, S.2802 would not bar these fees if circumstances at
the time of the settlement rejection made failure to accept the
offer reasonable; 234 codify, like S.141, the lodestar methodology
for fee computation, while prohibiting any form of multiplier or
bonus; 235 endow judges with specific discretion to reduce fees on
the basis of other equities in the case, such as some of the issues
raised in the current context of "special circumstances; '236 stipulate that only "necessary effort expended on prevailing issues"
is compensable; 237 permit, in accord with the case of Buxton v.
Patel, a judge to reduce an award of fees by up to twenty five
percent when the plaintiff wins substantial monetary
238
damages.
229. Id. at 389.
230. S. 2802, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
231. 130 CONG. REC. S. 8842, 8843 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of

Senator Hatch).
232. See notes
233. See notes
234. See notes
235. See notes
236. See notes
237. See notes
238. See notes

109-16, 143 and accompanying text.
129-42, 144-45 and accompanying text.
121-28, 146-47 and accompanying text.
148-85, 217, 219-20 and accompanying text.
57-81, 213-16 and accompanying text.
186-208, 217-18 and accompanying text.
67-68, 221-23 and accompanying text.
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On September 11, 1984, the Senate Constitution Subcommittee held a hearing on S. 2802. The testimony of Carol Dinkins,
Deputy Attorney General, was typical of evidence presented:
Three different types of difficulties occur in the administration of
the various fee-shifting statutes. The most obvious is the increasing incidence of inordinately high attorney fees or warrants
through use of multipliers and other means. Second is the great
disparity in awards that seems sometimes to border on the irrational. Third, and increasingly noticed by both judges and commentators, is the growing burden on the courts and litigants
imposed by a system where the rules are unclear and where the
parties are encouraged to engage in expensive litigation of attorney
than to enter upon settlements on the amount of
fee issues rather
239
attorney fees.
This hearing also featured testimony from the Attorneys General of the states of Massachusetts, Arkansas, and Utah. Each of
these state officials as well as the Deputy Attorney General of
the United States agreed that seventy-five dollars per hour
would be sufficient to attract competent counsel to prosecute
2
meritorious suits.

4°

Although the 98th Congress expired before S. 2802 could
progress beyond committee consideration, it is certain to be reintroduced and reviewed in the 99th Congress.

239. S. 2802: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (statement of

Carol Dinkins).
240. Id. Ms. Dinkins: "Even with the $75-an-hour limitation, there have
been many lawsuits brought under the Equal Access to Justice Act. That
number has not, I think, deterred litigation." Mr. Bellotti of Massachusetts:
"We would have no difficulty at all in attracting competent counsel for $75

an hour. Ours is an urban northeast state where fees are high generally...
But the short answer is: I would have no problem with $75 an hour." Mr.
Clark of Arkansas: "In Arkansas, $75 an hour would attract competent
counsel without question." Mr. Wilkinson of Utah: "The figure of $85 or $95
a hour is for the best firm in town I could find. I think that in our state $75
could attract competent counsel."

